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Standard operating procedures (SOPs) are a vital element of everyday operations in chemical 
process industries. Incident investigations also indicate that a majority of adverse events in the 
processing operations are ascribed to issues associated with SOPs. Although there have been 
continuous efforts to improve informational and perceptual aspects of SOPs, assessing them from 
a systems perspective remains a persistent gap. As one novel way to address such gap, this study 
employs an ecological approach to understand the functional structure of the work domain, that is, 
abstraction hierarchy (AH) and its relations to SOPs and operator performance. First, this study 
models a 3-phase separation system, a common gas-oil-water separation process, using an 
abstraction-decomposition space as a work domain of the system. Second, we assess the AH level, 
one dimension of the abstraction-decomposition space, of the SOPs developed for three tasks in 
the 3-phase separation system. In order to consider operators’ knowledge about the tasks, 
experience-task familiarity (E-TF) level is also assessed as a combinatory factor. To this end, a 
two-way analysis of variance is conducted to find out the effect of E-TF level (high vs. low) and 
AH level of the SOPs (physical vs. functional) on the operator’s performance. Results show 
significant main effects of the E-TF level and AH level on the successful performance of the SOPs. 
The interaction effect of the two variables is considered marginally significant. Based on the results, 
several implications for the design of SOPs in relation to the AH of the chemical processing 
domain are discussed. 
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1  Introduction 
 
It is widely accepted that standard operating procedures (SOPs) play a crucial role in achieving the 
desired level of safety and productivity in chemical process industries. An SOP is defined as a 
documented step-by-step instruction that guides operators in carrying out a specific task either 
routinely or non-routinely required [1]. Primary purposes that SOPs serve include: providing 
consistent, up-to-date, and recommended operation practices; informing operators of hazards 
associated with a task and pertinent control measures; and thus conducting a task in a safe, efficient, 
and effective manner. In pursuit of these advantages, statutory safety and health regulations and 
guidelines such as the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Process 
Safety Management (PSM) [2] and Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) [3] mandate 
industrial organizations to utilize SOPs in the course of employee training and actual operations. 
 
Issues associated with SOPs are pointed out as one of the major causes of incidents in chemical 
process industries. From a review of over 60 incident investigations conducted by the U.S. 
Chemical Safety Board (CSB), problems regarding SOPs were present in approximately 70% of 
the incidents [4]. The investigations revealed that SOPs were not properly developed, not complete, 
or not followed as instructed during the course of incidents. Similarly, an analysis of World 
Offshore Accident Databank indicated that the absence of procedures and inadequate procedures 
were responsible for over 80% of human-related causes [5]. More specifically, an investigation of 
2005 BP Texas City refinery explosion found out several issues with SOPs in the start-up process 
including operators’ deviations from critical steps of the SOPs and insufficient hazard information 
to be specified in the SOPs [6]. 
 
To address the issues associated with SOPs, three approaches have largely been taken towards the 
better design of procedures: informational, perceptual, and ecological approaches. First, the 
informational approach has emphasized standardizing and delineating information elements of an 
SOP. In this approach, a major focus is to specify SOP requirements such as purpose, scope, and 
general description of a task, hazards and precautions, required tools, equipment and supplies, 
procedural steps to conduct the task, and data and record management [7, 8]. Second, the 
perceptual approach has sought to examine the visual attributes of SOP components in relation to 
operators’ compliance. For instance, recent studies investigated features of a hazard statement 
including symbols, signal words (e.g., caution, warning), graphic embellishment (e.g., numbering, 
boxing, filling) [9, 10]. The findings from the informational and perceptual approaches were 
beneficial to illuminating what components need to be included in SOPs and how they should be 
formatted. Hence, their primary focus was mostly fixated on tackling task-specific matters with an 
ideal aim to make operators strictly comply with SOPs. However, other researchers assert that the 
zero-tolerance adherence to SOPs may be impossible and even deleterious to achieving safety of 
complex industrial operations due to constantly changing work environments, being often 
degraded from what was imagined in the SOPs [11, 12]. In addition, it is also suggested that the 
usage and role of the SOPs should change as the experience and knowledge of operators matures 
[13]. Recognizing the dilemma that underlies SOPs, the ecological approach views SOPs as 
decontextualized and abstracted artifacts that guide, not dictate, operators’ problem-solving 
depending on their experience and knowledge regarding the system to be operated [14]. In light of 
this standpoint, advocates of the ecological approach insist that under constantly changing or 
unexpected operating conditions, SOPs should be designed in such a way that they support 
operators to adjust their actions to unstable circumstances in order to accomplish higher system-
level goals [15, 16]. 
 
The ecological approach has been taken in designing cognitive work and associated information 
artifacts in safety-critical domains including chemical process industries. One of the principal 
concepts of the ecological approach is Abstraction Hierarchy (AH) of a system [17-19]. AH is a 
framework for representing the functional structure of a complex socio-technical system, 
consisting of several hierarchical levels that are bound in the goal-means relationship [20, 21]. AH 
principles have been applied to modeling various complex systems [22-25], devising work analysis 
method [26-28], and developing ecological interface design (EID) [29, 30]. The EID perspective 
aimed at externalizing operators’ mental model has proven to be effective in supporting detection 
of unexpected situations and adaptive actions to cope with such anomalies [31]. In particular, 
previous research indicates that operators who were more knowledgeable and experienced about 
the functional structure of a system better exploited the utilities of the EID in solving unexpected 
problems and accomplishing given goals [32, 33]. Similar work was conducted for petrochemical 
industries. For example, work domains of chemical processing systems such as hydrogenation 
reactor and fluidized catalytic cracking unit (FCCU) were analyzed using the abstraction-
decomposition space method [34, 35]. Furthermore, a control operator interface for the FCCU was 
developed using EID principles [36]. 
 
Although AH has been widely embraced in many studies across different domains and provided 
advantages in understanding and improving complex cognitive work systems, its application to 
SOPs used in high-risk environments is not existing to date. Also, research efforts that reflect the 
system’s functional structure (e.g., AH) on SOPs are largely absent in the current body of literature. 
Furthermore, little is known with respect to what roles operators’ knowledge of a task would play 
in relation to the functional structure of the system. As an exploratory effort to fill such gaps, our 
study aims 1) to analyze the work domain of a 3-phase separation system, a common crude oil 
refining process, and 2) to assess how an AH level reflected on the SOPs and an operator’s 
experience and familiarity with a task are related to SOP performance. 
 
2  Background 
 
2.1 Abstraction hierarchy and work domain analysis 
 
A work domain is referred to as a system space being acted upon, independent of any particular 
operator, event, task, or control interface [37]. Analyzing the work domain, namely, work domain 
analysis (WDA), is conducted to identify the functional structure of the system under examination 
and thus the first step of cognitive work analysis (CWA) [21]. WDA is aimed at eliciting the 
functional abstraction hierarchy (AH) and structural decomposition of the system. Combining the 
two orthogonal dimensions, an abstraction-decomposition space (ADS) is drawn (Figure 1). As 
described in Table 1, AH typically consists of five levels that are bound with the goal-means 
relationship in which a lower-level node acts as a means to achieve its immediate higher-level 
node. In this sense, higher levels of AH denote goals and abstract functions (‘why work is done’ 
and ‘what work is done’) of the system whereas lower levels are concerned with concrete and 
physical elements (‘how work is done’). Decomposition is laid out on the horizontal dimension 
incorporating a whole system, sub-system or unit, and component levels. 
 
Figure 1. Generic Abstraction-Decomposition Space with two dimensions of abstraction hierarchy and 
decomposition hierarchy 
 
Table 1. Levels of Abstraction Hierarchy 
AH Level Description 
Functional Purpose (FP) Ultimate goals that a system must achieve 
Abstract Function (AF) Governing laws and principles that constitute the system 
Generalized Function (GF) General processes involved in satisfying the governing principles 
Physical Function (PFu) Capabilities of physical elements to achieve the generalized functions 
Physical Form (PFo) Type, shape, location, and layout of physical elements 
 
2.2  Work domain of 3-phase separation system 
 
2.2.1  A description of 3-phase separation system 
 
A primary purpose of a 3-phase separation system is to separate upstream fluid produced from an 
oil well into three material components, that is, gas, water, and oil [38]. Of particular importance 
in the refining process is to completely separate any free water (water not bound to any grains or 
minerals) because free water is likely to cause corrosion or hydrate formation [39]. As shown in 
Figure 2, the 3-phase separation system includes several gravity-settling tanks in which heavier 
molecules (e.g., water, oil) fall down and lighter gases rise over the liquid [38]. After going through 
multiple separation tanks, each of the components is collected and discharged to respective 
downstream processes for further treatment. 
 
Figure 2. A simplified process flow diagram of the 3-phase separation system 
 
2.2.2  Work domain of 3-phase separation system 
 
As a work domain is independent of operators, tasks, or technical artifacts such as SOPs, we 
analyzed the work domain of a 3-phase separation system without regard to tasks examined in this 
study. As the first stage of the work domain analysis, the part-whole decomposition of the 3-phase 
separation system was conducted (Figure 3). The 3-phase separation system, which constitutes a 
larger chemical complex by connecting upstream (e.g., crude oil production) and downstream (oil 
stabilization) processes, is decomposed into multiple units at the sub-system level. The units at the 
sub-system level provide stream processing functions including fluid input, fluid containment, 
fluid output, level control, gas releasing, temperature control, pressure control, and energy control. 
These units are then further decomposed into specific physical functions and components such as 
fluid feed, pump, valve, separation vessels, and gas, oil, and water outputs.  
 
 
Figure 3. Part-whole decomposition of the 3-phase separation system 
 
Second, the ADS of the 3-phase separation system was generated by adding the AH to the 
decomposition dimension as shown in Figure 4. At the FP level, the ultimate goals of the system 
such as production and safety were defined: ‘producing oil from raw fluid’ and ‘securing the safety 
of separation process’. At the AF level, governing laws of the 3-phase separation system such as 
maintaining mass flux, separation, pressure, temperature, and energy were identified. At the GF 
level, generic processes required to satisfy the governing principles of the AF level were modeled. 
For example, the GF level includes transferring fluid input and output, containing the fluid, 
releasing gas, removing heat from the fluid, stratifying the fluid, and supplying energy source to 
enable other functions. As the GF level lies in the interface between functional levels and physical 
levels, the GFs were also identified both at sub-system and components levels. The PFu level 
shows capabilities of physical elements of the system such as fluid feed and phase separators, oil 
and water transfer, and gas venting were identified. Lastly, at the PFo level, specific physical 
elements such as pumps, valves, vessels, sensors, and topology among them were identified. The 
line between nodes in the ADS indicates the goal-means relationship in which lower-level nodes 
are needed to achieve a higher-level node. 
 
 
Figure 4. Abstraction-Decomposition Space of the 3-phase separation system 
 
3  Method 
 
3.1  Research setting 
 
To evaluate operators’ performance with SOPs in a realistic environment, data for this study were 
collected in a high-fidelity chemical processing training facility operated by a large petrochemical 
company located in the south-central U.S. The facility simulates an offshore oil production 
platform incorporating multiple trains of the 3-phase separation system. To realize the training 
purpose and eschew any potential risk, the facility uses vegetable oil, running water, and 
atmospheric air as substitutes for a natural crude oil stream. 
 
3.2  Participants 
 
Participants for this study were recruited via a third-party staffing agency specialized in the oil and 
gas industry. A total of 25 participants who were active workers in the oil and gas industry were 
recruited for this study. They were all males and their average age was 40.8 years (SD=12.3, 
min=20, max=63). The average years of industry experience were 14.3 years (SD=12.2, min=1, 
max=37). The occupational profile of the participants varied depending on the areas of experience 
in their career as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Occupational experience of the participants 
Area of occupation in the oil and gas industry % participants who had experience in the area 
Production and transportation 56% 
Engineering (e.g., electrical, mechanical) 32% 
Installation, maintenance, and repair 28% 
Extraction and rig operations 16% 
Management and supervisory 8% 
Construction 4% 
 
3.3  Tasks and materials 
 
Participants were asked to carry out four tasks: column flushing (CF), level control valve (LCV) 
replacement, pressure testing (PT), and fluid sampling with a centrifuge (Centrifuge). CF is a task 
that unloads fluids inside a column attached to a vessel. LCV is a maintenance task that replaces a 
level control valve that adjusts the fluid level in the vessel. PT is a task that tests high- and low-
pressure trips of the vessel. Centrifuge is a task that measures the water content of a sample product. 
Since Centrifuge is to assess the composition of the product regardless of a processing system type 
used to separate the stream, it was excluded from the current study. 
 
Prior to conducting a task, participants were given a paper-based SOP prepared by the training 
facility. The SOP consists of purpose and scope of work, document history, risk information, 
required permits such Lock-Out/Tag-Out (LOTO), necessary tools and equipment (e.g., PPE), and 
a series of steps to carry out. An example of the steps of LCV is shown in Figure 5. To record the 
participants’ actions during the SOP implementation, an Akaso Action Camera™ (Akaso Inc.) was 
attached to a participant’s hard hat. Due to technical difficulties associated with the portable video 
recorders (e.g., inadvertent change of a viewing direction), complete data for CF, LCV, and PT 
tasks were obtained from 19, 19, 22 participants, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 5. A sample of procedural steps of the LCV task 
 
3.4  Independent variables 
 
3.4.1  Experience-Task Familiarity (E-TF) level of participants 
 
Years of experience may represent an operator’s experience in a broad sense. However, the current 
study considers an individual operator’s knowledge as to how to perform a specific task. Therefore, 
the years of experience may not suffice as a single factor to judge whether or not a participant has 
adequate knowledge for the task. In addition, the divergence in participants’ areas of experience 
(Table 2) may render the years of experience a less indicative factor. To complement such 
limitations, participants’ experience and task familiarity were incorporated into a matrix as 
presented in Figure 6. Years of experience were scaled with five-year periods and task familiarity 
scale was obtained from a post-experiment interview with each participant. A diagonal border that 
includes either very low experience or very task familiarity was chosen to split a low and a high 
experience-task familiarity (E-TF) group. Participants having lower than 10 points (white cells in 
the matrix) were classified into a low E-TF group whereas those with equal to or higher than 10 
points (gray cells in the matrix) were put into a high E-TF group. Based on these criteria, 38% of 
participants were labeled as a low E-TF group.  
 
 
Figure 6. Experience-Task Familiarity (E-TF) matrix 
 
3.4.2  AH level of SOPs 
 
As the second categorical factor, the AH level that dominates an SOP was assessed. To do this, 
individual steps of the SOP was coded either functional (F) or physical (P) based on the ADS of 
the 3-phase separation system (Figure 4). To be noted is that the instructions regarding 
administrative measures such as work permit, LOTO (e.g., steps 1 through 6 in Figure 5) were 
excluded from the coding because they were considered to be part of another large work system 
and thus were simulated verbally or virtually. 
 
The coding of AH level was conducted by two of the authors (CS and NA). The average interrater 
reliability (Cohen’s 𝜅) between the two coders for the three SOPs was 0.70, indicating a moderate 
level of agreement [40]. Finally, the first author’s coding was used for analysis. Table 3 presents 
the results of binary coding (i.e., F/P). Based on the coding, CF and LCV were classified as 
physical-dominant SOPs and PT as a functional-dominant SOP in a relative sense. 
 
Table 3. Binary (F/P) coding results 
SOP (No. of steps) Physical (%) Functional (%) 
Column Flushing (13) 11 (85%)   2 (15%) 
Level Control Valve (16) 14 (88%)   2 (12%) 
Pressure Testing (12)   6 (50%)   6 (50%) 
Total 
 
31 (76%) 10 (24%) 
 
3.5  Dependent variable: Successful Step Ratio (SSR) 
 
In line with the prescriptive view towards SOPs, a traditional measure of operators’ procedure 
performance was how strictly they comply with procedural steps (e.g., compliance vs. non-
compliance) [41, 42]. In addition to this dichotomous measure, we attempted to reflect the 
ecological approach in the SOP performance measurement. Based on a procedural behavior 
assessment methodology developed by our research group [43], successful step ratio (SSR) was 
conceived as an operator’s SOP performance measure. SSR considers not only compliant and non-
compliant behaviors but also adapted actions from procedural steps and assisted or struggled 
actions as shown in Figure 7. The logic in this coding scheme enables a coder to label a procedural 
step whether the step is either compliance (C), adaptation (A), performance with issues (I), or non-
compliance (N). When the step was performed correctly without any assistance or struggling, the 
step was coded as compliance. When the step was performed correctly but with some assistance 
from instructors or struggling (e.g., spending a long time knowing what to do), the step was coded 
as performed with issues. When the step was performed correctly but out of order, the step was 
coded as adaptation. Non-compliance was coded when the step was completely skipped or ended 
incompletely. 
 
Although non-compliance with procedural steps may be claimed helpful in achieving the goals of 
a task, it would be an unusual situation such as an emergency event or a highly unstable work 
environment that warrants the deviation from the SOPs. Considering that the current study was 
conducted under a relatively stable condition (e.g., no emergency event), steps complied with and 
adapted were deemed to be successful. To that end, SSR is formulated as a ratio of compliance (C) 








Figure 7. Procedure step performance coding logic (adapted from [43]) 
 
3.6  Experiment Protocol 
 
There were six batches of participants with each batch taking two days for data collection. In the 
afternoon of the first day, a batch of participants checked in to the training facility and was given 
instructions on basic knowledge of the 3-phase separation process via in-class lecture and a tour 
to the processing trains in the facility. In total, the instructional session lasted for about three hours. 
In the morning of the second day, participants came to the facility and were asked to conduct 
individual tasks. After receiving the SOP for one task, the participant entered the processing trains, 
located the target equipment, and implemented the SOP. One to two instructors were positioned 
inside the facility and provided assistance when the participant asked or when the participant’s 
behavior was deemed unsafe. On completion of the task, the participant exited the processing trains 
and was given another task. An order of assigning tasks to the participants was randomized to 
control order effects. After all the participants in that batch finished all the tasks, another batch of 
participants checked in and followed the same protocol. This study was conducted in compliance 
with research protocols approved by the Institutional Review Board. 
 
3.7  Statistical Analysis 
 
Using the indices introduced in the preceding sections, two-way ANOVA was carried out to 
examine the main and interaction effects of an operator’s E-TF level and AH level of an SOP on 
SSR. The assumptions (e.g., normality and equal variance) for ANOVA were found to be satisfied 
by running Levene’s test and inspecting Q-Q plot. Partial eta squared (ƞp
2) was used to estimate 
effect size for the test and reported as being small (ƞp
2 < 0.06), medium (0.06 ≤ ƞp
2 ≤ 0.14), and 
large (ƞp
2 ≥ 0.14) [44]. All the statistical analyses were performed using JASP [45]. Statistical 
significance was concluded when p < 0.05. 
 
4  Results 
 
4.1 E-TF level and AH level of SOP on SSR 
 
We analyzed how an operator’s E-TF level (high vs. low) and AH level (physical vs. functional) 
of an SOP are related to SSR. As shown in Figure8, the average SSR was 0.66 for the physical-
dominant SOPs and 0.35 for the functional-domain SOP in the low E-TF group. Corresponding 
values for the high E-TF group were 0.85 and 0.74, respectively. Results of the two-way ANOVA 
indicate that there are main effects of the E-TF level (F(1, 56)=29.04, p < 0.001, ƞp
2 = 0.342, large 
effect size) and the AH level (F(1, 56)=15.44, p < 0.001, ƞp
2=0.216, large effect size). There was 




Figure. 8 Successful Step Ratio (SSR) by E-TF level and AH level 
 
5  Discussion 
 
As an exploratory study that embraces the ecological approach towards SOPs, the present study 
first modeled the work domain of a 3-phase separation system into an abstraction-decomposition 
space and applied the AH to three SOPs used in the high-fidelity chemical processing facility. We 
found out that individual steps of the SOPs were representing different AH levels (e.g., physical 
and functional) of the system. More specifically, our coding results indicated that physical-level 
steps were more prevalent than functional-level ones. The predominance of physical-level steps 
appears to be in line with the emphasis on standardization and specification of actions to be taken 
from the prescriptive approach [3, 4]. 
 
Our study then analyzed the relationship among the operators’ E-TF level and the AH level of the 
SOPs, and a ratio of successful steps. The results of the two-way ANOVA first suggest that the 
more the operator is experienced and familiar with a task, the more successful steps he/she 
performs. Second, it also indicates that the more physical steps the SOP contains, the more 
successful steps the operator carries out. Based on this finding, one may insist that the SOPs be 
designed in such a way that they specify procedural actions at a physical-level and sufficient 
training be provided to operators so that they become more experienced and familiarized with 
SOPs for given tasks [41]. 
 
While the prescriptive efforts in the design of SOPs may provide some benefits to operators (e.g., 
gaining experience through training under stable or ideal conditions), it still leaves the SOPs 
vulnerable to unpredicted and abnormal situations in which the operators have to deviate. To 
address this double-bind issue [46], results of the current study offer an opportunity to exploit the 
utilities of the ecological approach. As shown in the interaction trend of the E-TF level and AH 
level, albeit the marginally significant effect, operators with higher experience and task familiarity 
may have utilized their mental model of the system and thus exhibited comparatively consistent 
performance in the face of more functional, abstraction step descriptions [32, 33]. This 
interpretation then implies that SOPs should be designed in a way that they externalize the 
functional structure (e.g., AH) of the system and thus support operators’ goal-achieving behaviors 
when confronted with unexpected situations [31]. As an example of the SOP reflecting the 
ecological viewpoint, Figure 9 presents both physical-level actions (‘how’) and the purpose of 
doing such actions (‘why’). 
 
 
Figure. 9 A sample SOP for LCV that provides both a physical-level description and purpose of 
actions (changes from the original version, Figure. 5, are italicized) 
 
Notwithstanding the insightful findings presented in this study, limitations of the current study 
should be acknowledged. First, although the experiment was conducted in a high-fidelity 
environment, the presence of observers and instructors might have affected participants’ behavior 
representing less of actual operation practices. This limitation can be addressed by conducting 
similar experiments in real-world work environments. Second, another limitation exists in the 
design of SOPs used in this study. To maintain the fidelity of the experiment, we used the existing 
SOPs established by the training facility. Therefore, it was not possible to manipulate the level of 
AH as indicated in the verdict of PT as a functional-dominant SOP. Hence, in future studies, it is 
recommend to control the AH levels so that the degree of physical or functional dominance would 
become more evident. Third, we formulated a couple of novel indices to consider both the 
operators’ knowledge and familiarity with individual tasks (E-TF score) and the variations in the 
SOP-implementing behaviors (SSR). Due to relatively stable experimental conditions where no 
adversaries or unexpected situations arose, we found that adherence to the SOP steps largely led 
to successful outcome although some adaptations were also observed. Thus, future research may 
consider introducing abnormal or unanticipated events in order to examine how experienced and 
inexperienced operators comply with or deviate from the SOPs as well as to refine the SOP 
performance measure in alignment with the ecological approach. 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
As an exploratory research effort, this study employed an ecological approach towards the design 
of SOPs used in the 3-phase separation system. We found it useful to use AH in modeling a 
complex chemical processing system and in mapping AH to the steps of the SOPs. By analyzing 
the relationship among operators’ E-TF level and AH level of the SOPs, and the operator’s 
successful step ratio measure, this study identified that the more experienced and familiar with 
tasks, the more successful steps they carried out, and that the more physical steps the SOP include, 
the higher the successful step ratio. More importantly, our study results found an interesting 
tendency that the high E-TF group showed relatively stable performance in the use of the 
functional-level dominant SOP. To gain more benefits from the ecological approach, future 
research is warranted to address the limitations of the current study and to design SOPs that support 
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